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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

A.MERICAN SAVINGS & LOAN ASSO~:tATJON, a corporation,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.
\\iA\NE T. BLOMQUIST and RUTHE.

his wife, ZIONS SAVl'.''GS & LOAN ASSOCIATION, a cor!'( :·at10n, JOSEPH E. NELSON an d
PEOPLE'S FINANCE & THRIFT, a corBi~Ol\IQUIST,

Case No.
10,856

Defendants and Appellants.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
Suit by American Savings & Loan Association
to foreclose a real estate mortgage on residence of
Wayne T. Blomquist and Ruth E. Blomquist.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The Court at extensive pretrial discussions had
resolved all issues, except one, as matters of law and
had set up by its amendment to pretrial order the
jury question of whether respondent by its letter of
December 14, 1964, did in fact waive any existing
defaults by appellants. At a further conference held
between Court and counsel the day of the trial, the
Court determined that there was no question of fact
1

I

i

1

to submit to the jury. The Court there
.
upon d1~ I
.
h
d
h
C arge
t e JUry panel and granted resp d "'
. d
on ent a
JU gment of foreclosure of the mortgage in th
. dgment or judgment e na.h
t ure of summary JU
pleadings.
on t e
.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks to have the judgment of h
lower Court entitling it to accelerate the unp:i~ '
mortgage debt and granting judgment of foreclosur
. d.
t
sustame

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent does not have serious disagreement
with the statement of facts set forth in appellants' ,
brief as far as the statement goes. However, since
this case was decided by the lower Court as a matt€r
of law on facts which were undisputed, it is felt
a more detailed statement of facts should be pre·
sented.

1

Appellants are indebted to respondent on a note .
and mortgage (Exhibits P-1 and P-2). Appellants I
were late in making most of the monthly payments r
due on the loan (R. 20, 25-26, 122) and pursuant to
the terms of the note, respondent assessed and
attempted to collect late charges of $5.94 on each
payment made more than 20 days late (R. 122 and
Exhibit P-14). Appellants ignored and refused to
pay these late charges (Exhibits .P-4, P-~ .and P-14). f
That together with and m add1t10n to the
monthly payment on principal and interest on the
2

note, appellants by the terms of the mortgage, were
~·equired to pay to respondent a monthly installment,
as estimated by respondent, to be accumulated for
Jayment of taxes and insurance (Exhibits P-2 and
~-4). Respondent increased this monthly payment
$~.00 per month effective December 15, 1963, to
JJick up deficiencies in the reserve account and because of increased property taxes which went from
$299.88 for 1962 to $307.72 for 1963 to $354.76 for
1964. Appellants refused to pay this $2.00 per
month increase and disputed respondent's right to
make the increase (R. 19, Exhibits P-4 and P-14).
1

On December 14, __!_9-64, respondent made de'.1JaEd upon appellants by letter to bring the account
cErrent by paying the following amounts (Exhibit
P-4):

November 15th payment ________________ $149.00
11 payments short $2.00 each __________ 22.00
(Tax and insurance escrow)
14 unpaid late fees at $5.94 ____________ 83.16
Total Demanded ______________ $254.16
In that letter respondent stated that it would not
accept a partial payment and that if payment were
made after December 25, 1964, it would also be
necessary to include December 15th, 1964, payment.
Appellants tendered payment of $147.00 by
check (Exhibit D-8) to respondent sometime between
December 21, 1964, as contended by appellants (R.
132) and December 28, 1964, as contended by re3

spondent (R. 91). In any event, this tend
'
er was for
Iess t h an the $254.16 demanded since it di"d
.
~~
Id
cu e any of the 14 accrued late charges or the $29
d
h
... 0()
u$ n erphayments to t e escrow fund and was also
2 .00 s ort for the current payment.
·
On December 28, 1964, respondent refused the 1
tender and returned the check with respondent's
letter (Exhibit P-5) which stated the amount tend~ '
ered was incorrect and referred to respondent's letter of December 14, 1964, for the amount required to
bring the loan current through November 15, 1964.

Appellants again tendered to respondent this
same check representing payment of $147.00 on this
loan on January 6, 1965. Respondent once again
refused the tender and turned the check with respondent's letter of January 6, 1965 (Exhibit P-6)
which stated that partial payment would not be
accepted and that respondent must have remittance
in full to bring the loan current and setting forth 1
the amount necessary to bring the loan current and
referring to prior letters This letter stated "which
must reach our office immediately if additional expense and inconvenience are to be eliminated." The
amount demanded in this letter on this loan was ·
$409.10, which amount included the December 15,
1964, monthly installment, and a late charge on that
payment making 15 late fees in all which had been
incurred and remained unpaid and also included
the $22.00 to make up the prior payments which were
$2.00 short for tax and insurance reserves.

1
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Appellants tendered this same check representing payment of $147.00 on this loan a third time on
January 8, 1965, which tendered again ignored the
accrued late fees, the shortage in the reserve account,
and which was still $2.00 short of the then monthly
payment of $149.00 due November 15, 1964, and did
not include the December 15, 1964, payment.
This tender was refused by respondent a third
time and the check was returned to appellants in a
letter from respondent's attorney (Exhibit P-7)
elated January 8, 1965, which letter gave notice to
the appellants that respondent had elected to declare
and had declared+he full amount of the mortgage
debt due and payable pursuant to the provisions of
the note and mortgage and which letter gave appellants thirty days to pay off the loan.
At the time the $147.00 was first tendered, the
1964 general property taxes had been paid by respondent, which payment required respondent to use
$44.07 of its own funds (R. 94, 119-120).
Also, at the time the tenders were made, the
November 15, 1964, payment and the December 15,
1964, payment were due. The amount of these payments was $149.00 each made up of $118.75 principal and interest and the balance toward reserves
for taxes and insurance ( R. 90).
Respondent, pursuant to the terms of the mortgage, to preserve the lien of the mortgage, in addition to the payment of $44.07 toward the 1964
5

general property taxes, paid the following
.th .
f
a111ount1
w1 its own unds: $376.96 on November 000 , fo..'
19
for general property taxes for 1965 $372 93 ,: '
'
· on l\(1.
vember 30, 1966, for general property taxes for
1966, $38. 70 ?n Fe~rua.ry 25, 1965, to Salt Lakf
Suburban Samtary D1stnct No. 1 for service char ,
$57.15 on March 4, 1965, to Salt Lake County Tr~~:· I
urer to redeem sale for Salt Lake Suburban Sanitai:\·
District No. 1 service charges, $43.40 on July 1·~
1965, for fire insurance premium and $60.0(1 r~;
September 13, 1966, for fire insurance premium
(R. 93, 94, 119, 120). \Vhile respondenthasnotmarle '
demand on appellants for reimbursement~ neithPi
have appellants made any offer to pay these items.
1

1

Subsequent to the letter of January 8, 1965,
from respondent's attorney, appellants made tenders
which were sufficient to bring the installments cur.
rent. These tenders were refused by respondent for
the reason that it had declared the full amount of
the mortgage debt due (appellants' proposed Ex.
hibits D-9, D-10, and D-12).
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN DISMISSING
THE JURY AND GRANTING JUDGMENT OF
FORECLOSURE AS A MATTER OF LAW.

The first pretrial of this case was before Judge
Hanson on October 1, 1965 (R. 64, 65); subsequently
a trial was commenced before Judge Faux Septem·
6
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ber :26, 1966, which resulted in a mis-trial because
of misconduct of appellant Wayne T. Blomquist. The
case was then i·eferred to Judge Elton for further
nretrial, and extensive pretrial was held at which
acts, proposed exhibits and legal theories were
tboJ\!Ughly discussed and argued.
0

;

Judge Elton ruled as a matter of law as follows:
L Respondent did not waive any default which

11ay have occurred.

S. Tenders made by appellants of $147.00 were
adequate to cure the def a ult before respondent
c1eclared the entire debt due.
3. Return of the $147.00 check twice by respondent together with respondent's letters to appellants of December 14, 1964, December 28, 1964, and
January 6, 1965, was adequate notice to appellants
that respondent would require strict performance.
4. Appellants had been given reasonable time
to comply with respondent's demands for strict performance but had not performed and showed that
they did not intend to do so.

V..f e shall now examine the rulings of Judge
Elton to see if the undisputed facts support these
rulings:
1. RESPONDENT DID NOT WAIVE ANY DEFAULT
vVHICH MAY HA VE OCCURRED.

The letters from respondent to appellants of
December 14, 1964 (Exhibit P-4) December 28,
7

1964, (Exhibit P-5) and January 6 1965 (E h' .
'
'
X Ibit
P-6) express a demand for strict performance·
.
~~
1
ing payment of late charges and adequate month!.
payments toward taxes and insurance and not Y
election by respondent to collect a late charge 1·n 1,an
.
~
of_acceleratmg as contended by appellants. Acceler.
at10n came as a consequence of appellants' failure
to meet the demand for strict performance. These
three letters with the return of the $147.00 tender
taken together, cannot under any construction b~
deemed a waiver but constitute a clear, unmistak.
able demand for performance according to the agret.
ment. This was the basis of Judge Elton's ruling.
One other point, though hardly worthy of att€ntion, should be dealt with briefly so the Court will
know it has not been overlooked. Appellants con.
tend that they received a demand for payment of the
December 15, 1964, payment together with a demand
for payment of a late charge from respondent on or
about December 23, 1966 (R. 127, 128) and that
such demand constituted a waiver by respondent of
its acceleration.
It is a curious thing that it took until the day
of the trial for this interesing exhibit to come forth,
especially since it had been in the file of appellants'
attorney all the time since received (R. 127),.and
after extensive pretrial proceedings over a consider·
able period of time at which all legal theories, facts
and documents had been thoroughly discussed.
Respondent denies that what appellants received
8
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was a demand for payment and that it had the effect
claimed for it by appellants of waiving acceleration
cf the obligation.
~. TENDERS

MADE BY APPELLANTS OF $147.00
WERE NOT ADEQUATE TO CURE THE DEFAULT
BEFORE RESPONDENT DECLARED THE ENTIRE
DEBT DUE.

The mortgage provides that together with and
in addition to the monthly payments of principal and
:nterest payable under the terms of the note secured
thereby, the mortgagor will pay to the mortgagee,
each month until the note is fully paid, a sum for
fire insurance premiums and taxes, all as estimated
by the mortgagee, etc. (Exhibit P-2). The mortgage
further provides: "If default be made in any agreement herein contained, or in the payment of any
money hereby secured - , the mortgagee, -, may
without prior notice or demand declare the entire
indebtedness due and foreclose this mortgage -."
The mortgage further states that it is made for
the purpose of securing prompt payment of the note,
according to its tenor. The tenor of the note calls
for monthly payment of principal and interest and
further provides for payment of a stated collection
charge (late fee) to cover additional cost of handling
any monthly payment made more than 10 days after
it is due. In other words, the collection charge or
late fee, when incurred, is as much a part of the
obligation secured by the mortgage as are the principal and interest.
9

The monthly payment to be made by th
.
gagor to the mortgagee of a sum fol' pa e 11101 t·
Yl11ent of
·
.
.
t axes an d msurance
is a covenant by the 11 ·t
101 gagor
appe 11ant; the amount of the monthly pay1 t .
b "
.
db
11en i0
.e. as estimate y the mortgagee" respondent. Th,
failure by the mortgago1 to make these lJay111 't .'
e1, s E
a breach of an agreement of the mortgage and bi:
the terms of the mortgage itself gives the mortga ·
the right to declare the entire indebtedness due;:~
foreclose the mortgage.
·

1

In the absence of a showing that the inC!'ease
of $2.00 per month was capricious or arbitrary, the
mortgagor should be bound by the increase. Appellants for 11 months had refused to increase the
monthly payment into the tax and insurance resern
by $2.00 and disputed respondent's right to increase
the amount (R. 19, 91), even though, when the 1964
taxes were paid by respondent, there 1rns not enougn
money in the reserve account to pay the taxes and ,
this necessitated respondent's advancing $44.07 to
pay the taxes (R. 119), and left nothing in the
reserve account toward fire insurance premium.

1

Appellants contend failure to pay the late
charges and failure to pay the full amount estimated
by respondent into reserve for taxes and insurance
does not give respondent the right to accelerate the
unpaid balance. Reduced to its simplest term~,
appellants' argument is that appellants coul~ c~m
pletely ignore accrued late charges and the obhgat10n
to pay taxes so long as appellants paid the monthly
10

installment of principal and interest when due, that
respondent could not accelerate the obligation; and
further, that respondent would have to pay the taxes
2nd/or insurance and then demand reimbursement
fr1Jm appellants and be refused before respondent
could accelerate. Such a conclusion does violence to
the elem·, expressed language of the agreement between the parties in the form of the note and mortgage.
Appellants cite and rely upon the case of Homeon11er.s Loan Corp v. Washington (1945 Utah) 180
l'. 469, 161 P.2d 355, involving foreclosure of a
n:ortgage which contains some language similar to
some of the language of the mortgage in this case
ai:d which case held that where the note and mortgage required payment by the mortgagee of taxes
and assessments and demand for repayment before
it could declare a forfeiture, the mortgagee would
have to comply with the terms of the instruments
to create those rights.
In that case, however, there is nothing to show
that the mortgage provided, as does the mortgage
in our case, that the mortgagor had agreed to make
monthly payments to mortgagee toward taxes and
failed to do so. Because of this, the Homeowners
Loan case is not determinative or even helpful in the
problem here.
Appellants claim respondent waived its right
to obect to the purported insufficiency of the tender
11

made on or about December 21 1964 b f ..
. l d
d
,
, Y ailing t
inc u e a em~nd for the December 15 ,
~J
1964
ment and to raise any objection in the letter f, P.ay.
0 reJec
f
(E h.b.
10n
x i it P-5) and then cite 78-27-3, Utahc ·
Annotated, regarding objection to tender.
ode
Respondent's letters to appellants ( P-4 p ,
, -5 anl'
P-6). set forth precisely what amount of money wa;
reqmred and why the tenders were refused and th
partial payment would not be acceptable. This cm~'.
plies with the requirement of the statute.
Certainly on January 6, 1965, respondent had
the right to demand payment of the November 15.
1964, and the December 15, 1964, payments which
it did in its letter of that date. Neverless, the
tender and only tender made by appellants in response to that letter was on January 8, 1965, of
$147.00 which was not even enough to pay the No.
vember 15, 1964, payment.

It must therefore follow that in the absence of
a modification of the agreement between the parties

in the f orrn of the note and mortgage, the tender
by appellant of $147.00 was never an adequate tender
of what was then due respondent.
3. RETURN OF THE $147.00 CHECK TWICE BY RE·
SPONDENT, TOGETHER WITH RESPONDENT'S
LETTERS TO APPELLANTS OF DECEMBER 14,
1964, DECEMBER 28, 1964, AND JANUARY 6, 1965,
WAS ADEQUATE NOTICE TO APPELLANTS THAT
RESPONDENT WOULD REQUIRE STRICT PER·
FORMAN CE.

Respondent recognizes the validity of the legal
12

proposition, and the cases cited in support thereof
in appellants' brief, that where the mortgagee has
repeatedly accepted late payments from the mortgagor, leading the latter to ?elieve that strict performance would not be required, a duty is imposed
on the mortgagee of giving to the mortgagor a
reasonable notice before the mortgagee may insist
on strict performance by the mortgagor in the future.
Respondent believes that such a reasonable notice
had been given.
Admittedly, there had been a history of late
payments and of respondent's tolerating them. There
had also been a history of appellants' ignoring their
obligation to pay collection charges or late fees and
ignoring the request that they increase the monthly
payments toward taxes and insurance.

i

II.

On December 14, 1964, respondent made demand upon appellants to pay the November 15, 1964,
monthly payment plus $22.00 accrued through 11
payments being $2.00 short toward taxes and insurance and the 14 accrued late charges, and stating
that partial payment would not be accepted (Exhibit
P-4). This demand was clear, but standing alone, it
may not have been adequate notice that respondent
would accelerate the obligation. But coupled with
the return of the $14 7. 00 tender and the letter of
December 28, 1964 (P-5) and the second return
of the $147.00 tender and the letter of January 6,
1965 (P-6) again stating the amount due and demanding immediate payment of this amount, there
13

could be no doubt in the mind of an ordina,1
Y, reaso '
a bl e man that respondent would demand st.· n.
.
f ormance. Th is 1etter of January 6 1965i1ct Pel'· ,
·
.
'
' state,· '
th a t f u 11 reqmred
rennttance
must reach
' ff.
.
.
respond
ent s o ice immediately if additional expen
·
.
.
~~
inconvemence are to be eliminated. The onl, d1
t.
1
.
Ya r11.
iona expense and mconvenience that could resul
was acceleration and foreclosure, and this is the cor'.
sequence respondent is warning appellants of in thi~
letter.
'
Appellants cite the case of Pacific DeDelopmn t
Conipany v. Stewart, (Utah 1948) 113 U. 403, 19.i
P.2d 748, and quote Justice Pratt, speaking for the
Court on page 750 as follows: "There is no question
that the acceptance by the seller of the buyers' past
due p2,yrnents and its other conduct toward the
buyers leading the latter to believe that strict per.
f on11ance would not be required by the seller, imposes
upon the seller the duty of giving to the buyer a
reasonable notice before it may insist on strict perf orrnance by the buyers."
1

This is a fair statement of the law applicable in
our case, although that case involved forfeiture of
buyers' interest under a real estate contract. That
case further says at page 750: "Though seller's con·
duct may have lead the buyers to believe that the
seller would not insist on prompt payments being
made, nothing about its actions should have ~ead
them to believe that seller had permanently waived
its right to declare a forfeiture of whatever interest
14

buyers had in the contract; nothing in the terms of
th~ contract, or the acts of the parties, indicate an
intention to penalize the seller for leniency."
Appellants cite the case of Brown v. Hewitt
'1940 Tex. Civ. App.) 143 SW2d 223, as authority
~or the proposition that a lender who had accepted
from borrower overdue installments on a note would
not be permitted suddenly to revert to the terms of
ihe note so as to enforce an optional acceleration
clause without first giving borrower specific notice
of his intention. This case says nothing about notice
of specific intention to accelerate. What it does say
and what it stands for is that a holder of a note and
deed of trust could not accelerate maturity of the
entire indebtednes for failure to pay monthly installments on the due date, where the holder did not
afford the maker an opportunity to pay installments
before acceleration, and the installment was paid a
few days late according to usual course of dealing
of the parties.
What more emphatic demonstration could there
be that respondent required strict performance than
its refusing less than strict performance, returning
the tender of an amount less than strict performance
and demanding in clear language what was required!
4. APPELLANTS HAD BEEN GIVEN REASONABLE
TIME TO COMPLY WITH RESPONDENT'S DEMANDS FOR STRICT PERFORMANCE BUT HAD
NOT PERFORMED AND SHOWED THAT THEY
DID NOT INTEND TO DO SO.

Appellants were given notice of respondent's
15

demand by the letter of December 14 196 4
'
, and c
not perform. This demand was repeated b t' 1111
t er on D ecemb er 28, 1964, and again no perfY he let·
~~
t o meet t he demand. This was repeated a third
rt:
by the letter of January 6 ' 1965. Again , ten derJllJµ,
only part of what was due. Thereafter, on Januai-·1t
1
8, 1965, respondent declared the entire debt due an'
payable.
a
1

1

The time from December 14, 1964, when de.'
mand for strict performance was first made to Janu.
a:y 8, 1965, when respo~dent accelerated the obliga.
tion, was not a long period, and standing alone afttr
a long history of late payments, might raise a ques- .
tion whether this was a reasonable time for appellants to perform strictly according to the terms of
the note and morgage. In other words, if appellants
had done nothing after receiving respondent's demands, it might well be a legal question whether
appellants were given a reasonable time. The actions
of the appellants, however, eliminate this question.
Three times the appellants tendered less than tne
amount due and demanded. This can have no mean·
ing other than that appellants did not intend to mah 1
payment to comply with the demands for strict per· r
f ormance of the agreement. This conduct by appel·
lants indicated that the amount of time in this ca.11 i
would make no difference. Such conduct demon·
started that appellants intended to continue their j
prior course, to ignore their obligation to pay la\t ',
charges and the increase in monthly payments t.()
1

1
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ward taxes and insurance to make the payment adequate, to ignore making the December 15, 1964,
,1ayment as demanded, and that appellants chose to
~lispute respondent's right to assess late charges and
to increase the monthly payment toward taxes and
insurance regardles of the amount needed to pay
these i terns.

!

,,

In the case of Pacific Development Company v.
Stewart (1948 Utah) 195 P.2d 748, cited supra,
the Court further states: "Where the facts surrounding the transaction are undisputed, as they are
in this case, this Court may determine, as a matter
of law, what is a reasonable time. We hold that 23
days was a reasonable time to allow defendants to
make up the overdue payments under the circumstances of this case." Respondent's letters of December 14, 1964 (Exhibit P-4) December 28, 1964
(Exhibit P-5) and January 6, 1965 (Exhibit P-6)
express a demand for strict performance including
payment of late charges and adequate monthly payments for taxes and insurance, and not an election
by respondent to collect a late charge in lieu of
accelerating as contended by appellants. Acceleration came as a consequence of appellants' failure to
meet the demand for strict performance, not as a
result of respondent's suddenly shifting its position
as contended by the appellants. The only shift by
respondent was that after an unsatisfactory history
of receiving payments late and of appellants' ignoring late charges which had accrued and of ignoring
17

the increase for taxes and insurance i·es d
'
Pon ent'
three letters to appellants demanded
' in
.
.
Pay111eir"
strictly accordmg to the terms of the note d le
an 111ort.
gage.
CONCLUSION
The trial Court was confronted with the applica.
ti on of the law of these undisputed facts: The hor.
rower generally made payments late, complete!\'
ignored the obligation to pay late charges and th~
obligation to pay an adequate monthly amount toward taxes and insurance as estimated by the lender.
the lender made three written demands upon the
borrower for strict performance setting forth in
itemized form or specific amounts what was demanded, ref used to accept less than strict perform.
ance, and the borrower failed and refused to comply
with these demands.
The trial Court arrived at the only decision it
could have under these circumstances, that there
was a default which had not been waived, that '
reasonable notice of the requirement of strict performance was given, that there was no compliance,
that the respondent had the right to accelerate the
obligaion and obtain a judgment of foreclosure.
•

Under these facts, it is clear there was no JU111
question, and the judgment of the trial Court, de18

I
'

cided as a matter of law, that respondent was entitled to a decree of foreclosure should be sustained.
Respectfully submitted,

A.H. BOYCE
Attorney for PlaintiffRespondent
400 Executive Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone 355-2886
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